Modern constitutionalism involves a tension between the "constituent power" of the sovereign people and the constitutional forms that are intended to express and check this power. The idea of the people as constituent power, as the active creators of the constitutional order, is familiar in American constitutionalism.
1787, could establish or alter a constitution. It was an extraordinary invention, the most distinctive institutional contribution, it has been said, the American Revolutionaries made to Western politics. It not only enabled the constitution to rest on an authority different from the legislature's, but it actually seemed to have legitimized revolution." 3 Thus, the conventional meaning of constituent power within American constitutionalism is the power of the people to change the Constitution through amendment or a constitutional convention.
Members of the founding generation did not see frequent recourse to Article V as desirable. James Madison argued that frequent recourse to amendment would imply that the Constitution was seriously defective. Madison noted that the Constitution would benefit from "that veneration, which time bestows on every thing," 4 and that this veneration would enhance the stability of the government. The most serious danger of frequent change through amendment was "of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions." 5 Madison thought that the commendable deliberation that had attended the adoption of state constitutions was due to the unique characteristics of the revolutionary era. Because it was unlikely that those circumstances would recur, frequent recourse to amendment would engage the passions of the public, 2 Wood, 342. 3 Article V requires that amendments be approved by a supermajority of both houses of Congress and by a supermajority of state legislatures before they can take effect. U.S. Const., Art. V. 4 James Madison, The Federalist No. 49, in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (1961) 340. 5 Ibid.
not its reason. 6 Making amendment of the Constitution relatively easy would have the effect of continually placing the fundamental structure of the government up for grabs.
Ordinary political struggles might be transformed into constitutional crises. While
Madison saw that provision had to be made for amendment, he believed that it would be appropriate only on "certain great and extraordinary occasions."
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After the Constitution was ratified, it might appear that there was no further opportunity for the exercise of the primordial constituent power. 8 Constituent power could be exercised only through the forms specified in the Constitution and "the people themselves" 9 would rarely be found on the constitutional stage. This states the understanding of most American constitutional lawyers. Because a second constitutional convention is so unlikely, the only practical way for "constituent power" to influence the Constitution is through the Article V amendment process. This understanding informs a conventional view about how constitutional change occurs. Constitutional change can take place only through Article V amendments or judicial interpretation. Lawyers differ over which cases exemplify constitutional change, but all would agree that it has occurred primarily through doctrinal interpretation by the Supreme Court.
Contrary to the conventional view, from the beginning of the American republic constituent power has changed the constitutional order through informal constitutional change. Indeed, the conventional view has been extensively critiqued and revised by scholars interested in the process of constitutional change. 10 These scholars have put 6 Ibid 340-43. 7 Ibid 339. For discussion see Stephen M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (1996) 28-46. 8 See Madison, Federalist No. 63 (total exclusion of people in their collective capacity). 9 See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004) . 10 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (1991); Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Transformations (1998); Griffin (n 7 above); Kramer (n 9 above); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional forward a new approach to constitutional change that involves highlighting the importance of institutions and the constituent power of the people.
In this article, I will argue that three ideas are fundamental to understanding the role of constituent power in constitutional change:
(1) Political constitutions are self-enforcing documents.
(2) How constitutional change occurs is influenced by the degree to which the constitution has been "legalized."
(3) Change can be constitutional without being legal. That is, a significant amount of constitutional change occurs through the ordinary political process.
I first describe each idea briefly and then provide a more detailed discussion by situating the relationship between constituent power and constitutional change in the context of the early republic. I then discuss some of the methodological issues raised by the study of non-legal or informal constitutional change. Finally, I use the example of presidential power to illustrate how informal constitutional change can serve as a lens for understanding contemporary American constitutionalism.
Constitutions as Self-Enforcing
Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning (1999 When an ordinary law is violated, some external agency stands ready to enforce the law and remedy the violation. By contrast, constitutions must be self-enforcing. 11 In the constitutional sphere, there is no external agency available (if there were, it would not be subject to the constitution). Lacking an external agency, constitutions must ultimately be enforced by the operation of the entire political system, or, one might say, by the people as a whole.
There is some evidence that the founding generation understood this point. This was "popular constitutionalism," the idea that "the Founders expected constitutional limits to be enforced through politics and by the people rather than in courts. . .Their history, their political theory, and their actual experience all taught that popular pressure was the only sure way to bring an unruly authority to heel."
12
The enforcement of the U.S. Constitution by the judiciary does not alter this fundamental reality. The judiciary enforces the Constitution from within the constitutional system, not by acting as an external enforcement agency. The judiciary derives its authority from the Constitution, not the other way around. But this purely legal point does not get to the heart of the matter. As part of the constitutional system, the judiciary is subject to the reality of self-enforcement. The structure and composition of the judiciary can be altered in the course of ordinary politics and in response to judicial decisions. The judiciary thus has to swim in the same political sea as other constitutional institutions.
The Legalized Constitution
A constitution is legalized to the extent it is made cognizable by lawyers and courts. The U.S. Constitution was legalized in the first decades of the new republic in the course of a struggle fought over the boundary between law and politics. 13 The process of legalization involved assimilating the Constitution and its interpretation into the structure of ordinary law. Lawyers of the founding generation argued, for example, that the Constitution should be interpreted according to the principles used to construe other legal documents.
Within the sphere of the legalized Constitution, decisions by the judiciary are regarded as authoritative. But the institutional limits of the judiciary affect the scope of the legalized Constitution. The federal courts cannot create cases and depend on the other branches to enforce judgments. The judiciary thus cannot supervise everything in the political system that might affect the meaning and operation of the Constitution.
Legalizing the Constitution made it enforceable, but it also made large areas of the constitutional order subject to ordinary political change.
Constitutional Change and the Political Process
Constitutional change can occur through either a legal (formal) or non-legal 
Constitutional Change in the Early Republic
A self-enforcing constitution with a limited sphere of legalization creates both the necessity and opportunity for change outside the legal process. The Constitution of 1787 created institutional uncertainties and gaps that were addressed through a process of informal constitutional change. Did "advise and consent" mean that the President was supposed to go to the Senate and literally ask for it? President Washington thought so (but the Senate disagreed). Did the requirement of Senate approval for presidential appointments mean that approval was required for removals? The president's power to remove executive officials was the subject of a famous debate in the House of Representatives in 1789.
14 These instances of informal change can be described using the categories of ordinary legal change. Thus, the practices followed in President Washington's first administration are sometimes referred to as "precedents" arising from constitutional "interpretation." The use of terms drawn from ordinary law to describe constitutional change shows the influence of the legalized Constitution. It would be a mistake, however, to think that we can understand constitutional change solely in this way. Of course, these practices do not literally have the status of judicial precedents, but the problems with this approach go beyond this point. These changes occurred in a political and institutional context that cannot be captured through concepts drawn from ordinary law. They involved reasons and argument that go beyond standard methods of constitutional interpretation. In addition, change arising from the political process may be inadvertent and justified in legal terms only after the fact.
These changes are best understood as alterations to structuring rules and practices that are the functional equivalent of those written in the Constitution. Their legal status is uncertain and they are not best understood as "extra-constitutional," as if there were a clear dividing line between the constitutional rules inside and outside the Constitution.
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Certainly they are easier to modify than the rules contained in the text, but once they are established, changing them is not the stuff of ordinary politics. Another kind of constitutional change in the early republic consisted of struggles over constitutive rules, those that were believed to be fundamental to the purpose of the On one level, the conflict over the national bank was an exercise in interpreting a specific provision of the Constitution, the "necessary and proper" clause.
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Contemporary lawyers who find Hamilton's interpretation sound might argue that there was no constitutional change involved. This might be a persuasive doctrinal argument, but it is poor constitutional history. In every decade after President Washington's signing of the original bank bill, the issue of the bank was highly controversial. This was because new order of things in the federal government. 19 Federalists were opposed to parties, indeed opposed to the very idea of opposition in government, but they lost the initiative and eventually their party disappeared.
The advent of political parties had such far-reaching implications for U.S.
constitutional government that it is very hard to believe the Constitution would have been written in the same way had the founders known of them in advance. This is the best way to understand the idea that the Constitution was antidemocratic or, at least, was adopted in a predemocratic era. Parties meant a role in government for ordinary people, However, the logic driving informal change goes deeper. The constitutive and ideological power of the Constitution, its ability to embody the identity of the polity, means that citizens will tend to regard even significant changes as realizations of its ultimate purposes. Hamilton certainly believed that the national bank was constitutional, despite strong objections. The sincere belief that potentially radical changes accord perfectly with the Constitution's ultimate purposes has played a much larger role in U.S.
constitutional history than duplicitous efforts to change the document through interpretation rather than amendment.
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The politics of the early republic showed that it was difficult to draw a sharp line between what counted as an interpretation and what counted as an amendment.
Advocates of constitutionally controversial policies (like the bank) and institutions (like political parties) argued with perfect sincerity that they were consistent with the Constitution. Their opponents could not show them to be clearly wrong. Because no obvious legal line had been crossed, the debates occurred in the realm of ordinary politics, and no amendments were proposed. At the same time, the intense and lasting character of these debates left few doubts that the institutional ordering established in 1787 had changed. Constitutional change had occurred through a process that was primarily political, not legal. This conception of constitutional change has important implications for how we understand American constitutionalism. The relative lack of formal amendments and the limited scope of judicial power means there is no legally certain way to track constitutional change. However, the history of the early republic suggests another approach. We might attempt to track constitutional change through a better understanding of changes in governing institutions and political orders.
Understanding Constitutional Change
Identifying structural political changes as constitutional in the absence of formal amendments can make people uneasy. How are we to tell the difference between changes that are merely political and changes that are truly constitutional? We require some way of tracking constitutional change outside of formal amendments and judicial precedents.
Any sustained inquiry into constitutional change thus raises questions of method.
It is important to realize, however, that there is no escaping the reality of constitutional into an inquiry that is intended to achieve a comprehensive view of the non-legalized The task of understanding the Constitution at any particular point in time thus becomes a matter of establishing the ways in which multiple structuring institutions, orders, and rules intersect to establish a pattern for political action. Understanding the Constitution across time involves recognizing patterns of interaction and proposing theories to explain constitutional development.
Consider presidential impeachment as an example. If we study impeachment in the same way we study doctrine, we focus on the clauses of the Constitution at issue and how they were interpreted by Presidents Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton and their adversaries. Given that the impeachment process occurs outside the courts, this is also the approach of scholars interested in the Constitution as "interpreted" by the political branches. By contrast, using constitutional change as a lens for understanding examining change as a self-conscious process. We should take into consideration whether the participants thought constitutional change was going on but then check to see whether later developments confirmed that the changes had staying power.
Constitutional change outside the legalized Constitution is thus about constitutional institutions in development through history. Return to the example of political parties. Their creation might be said to express the constitutional principle that there should be a loyal opposition in a democracy. We would be badly misled, however, if we were to treat this principle as the causal reason why political parties formed in the first few decades of the early republic. Political parties formed for all sorts of reasons, but the point from a developmental perspective is that they made a substantial difference to how the constitutional order operated. It is appropriate to conclude that they changed the Constitution itself.
Finally, we might ask whether a developmental perspective is relevant to the conventional understanding lawyers and judges have of constitutional change. If a developmental perspective does not generate legal-constitutional norms (at least in the first instance), what is its status relative to the standard project of interpreting the Constitution to make judicial decisions? In response, it is important to appreciate initially that the primary goal of a developmental perspective is not to resolve cases but to understand how the constitutional system works. This is the same point of view the founding generation had as the Constitution was being written, ratified, and put into operation. They were concerned with the constitutional order as a whole, not specific But the events of 9/11 triggered institutional changes with potentially momentous constitutional implications. These implications are best grasped through the lens afforded by the study of constitutional change.
The Lens of Constitutional Change
The Supreme Court occasionally highlights the degree to which constitutional institutions have changed over time. The circumstances of the famous Steel Seizure 40 case, decided during the Korean War, led Justice Jackson to focus on changes to the presidency in his justly praised concurring opinion: "[I]t is relevant to note the gap that exists between the President's paper powers and his real powers. The Constitution does not disclose the measure of the actual controls wielded by the modern presidential office.
That instrument must be understood as an Eighteenth-Century sketch of a government hoped for, not as a blueprint of the Government that is. Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity.
Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power that do not show on the face of the Constitution."
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Here Justice Jackson used the lens of constitutional change to better understand the presidency and thus, the Constitution itself. He focused on the presidency as an institution and the difference that existed between the institution described in the text ("paper powers") and the real constitutional power the presidency had acquired over 40 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952 In the years following 9/11 U.S. lawyers and legal scholars have had a similar vertiginous sense that their constitutional universe has changed in unexpected ways. If Congress was the danger, increased presidential power and authority appeared to be the solution.
Increased presidential power led to a new series of constitutional dangers.
Presidents assumed they had the unilateral power to lead the U.S. into war, a problem many thought exemplified by the Vietnam War. The indefinite nature of the Cold War led presidents to apply tactics suited to foreign affairs to the domestic sphere, a phenomenon which contributed to the great scandal and constitutional crisis of Watergate. 45 Informal constitutional change appeared to offer flexibility at the price of unanticipated and unwelcome side effects.
The party system played an important role in shaping how the constitutional lessons of Vietnam and Watergate were perceived by political actors. The lessons, such as they were, were absorbed principally by elites associated with the Democratic party.
They believed that the presidency had become "imperial" and had to be reined in by an assertive Congress cognizant of its role as the true repository of constituent power. By contrast, the Republican party remained relatively unaffected by these supposed insights.
For Republican elites, the lesson of the 1970s was that Watergate led to an overreaction against presidential power. They continued to see the president as the natural leader of government, especially in foreign affairs, and set forth the theory of the "unitary executive" during President Reagan's administration in the 1980s. Many of these Republicans would later play key roles in the 9/11 administration of President Bush.
At one level, the unitary executive was a way to counterbalance the legacy of Using the lens afforded by constitutional change, we can see that the constitutional perspective the Republicans had developed on the presidency left them well prepared to respond to the 9/11 attacks. President Bush immediately categorized the attacks as a military operation, akin to an invasion by a foreign state. The President told his advisers "'we're at war'" 46 just hours after the attacks occurred and made a global war on terror the official policy of the executive branch. 47 And at one and the same time, it was unconventional warfare beyond the standard laws of war. In addition, it could be construed as warfare going on inside the country. As the Commander in Chief responding to a surprise attack, he was at the zenith of his constitutional power. The legal battles that followed over the Bush administration's 9/11 measures illustrate the tensions between formal and informal constitutional change. To those inside the sphere of the legalized Constitution, constituent power and, indeed, the presidency itself can appear to be dangerous wild cards within the constitutional order.
How to bring these wild cards safely under legal control is not obvious. Consider that the Bush administration has consistently opposed judicial review of its wartime measures.
When cases are brought, the administration has argued that the judiciary has no role supervising its conduct of the war on terror. Subjecting presidential initiatives to judicial review means legalizing wartime measures that the executive branch sees as exercises of 48 See Margulies (n 42 above).
discretion. But lawyers outside the government have been struggling consistently to legalize the war and thus bring it within the sphere of formal constitutional change. 
Concluding Remarks
Consider some common opposed observations about American constitutionalism:
It is based on a designed order expressed solely in the Constitution or it has changed informally in such significant ways that it now resembles the "unwritten" tradition 49 See ibid.
characteristic of British constitutionalism. The constituent power of the people plays no direct role in American constitutionalism, other than through the amendment process or the interpretation of the Constitution is influenced by public opinion and the constituent power of the people can change the Constitution through informal means.
Perhaps it would be too much to expect that the lens of constitutional change could help us solve these paradoxes. But we can make some headway if we use the study of constitutional change to help us understand how all of these statements shed some light on the nature of American constitutionalism. Portions of the original constitutional design survive today, but no part has been immune from the effects of history and informal constitutional change. Institutions such as the presidency that have undergone the greatest change still bear marks of their original design and the hopes of the founding generation. While the constituent power of the people is still seen by many as dangerous to the integrity of constitutional forms, there are very few who would deny that it has had a role in shaping American constitutionalism. Progress would be for constitutional scholars to achieve a greater historical understanding of these phenomena before moving on to their perennial normative projects.
